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ONLY THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO PRINT: THE EFFECT
OF HAZELWOOD ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
VIEWPOINT-NEUTRALITY REQUIREMENT IN PUBLIC
SCHOOL-SPONSORED FORUMS
Janna J. Annest
Abstract: In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
public school administrators can restrict expression in school-sponsored forums in a manner
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Regulating First Amendment rights in
any public forum usually requires that no point of view be suppressed in favor of its
counterpoint, but the Hazelwood Court omitted the viewpoint-neutrality requirement from its
holding. While the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits continue to require viewpoint-neutral
regulation of school-sponsored speech, the First and Third Circuits interpret Hazelwood as
abrogating the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in school-sponsored forums. This Comment
argues in favor of the interpretation advanced by the First and Third Circuits. First, the text of
the Hazelwood opinions supports elimination of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement.
Second, the tradition of judicial deference to local authorities in matters of school
administration conflicts with a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality, and such a requirement
would hinder the public school's ability to function as both an arm of state government and in
loco parentis. Finally, abrogation of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in public schools
would avoid the doctrinal confusion associated with viewpoint and content-based restrictions.
A journalism class at a local high school plans to publish an article
entitled "Education in Tolerance."' The article discusses homosexual
awareness programs in schools throughout the country, the formation of
"Queer Clubs," the meaning of symbols such as the pink triangle, and
lists famous historical homosexuals. One student in the class believes
that homosexuality is an unacceptable lifestyle choice and wishes to
include another article in the same issue. This article details state anti-
sodomy laws, includes Bible verses condemning homosexual acts, and
presents statistics about the prevalence of AIDS in the gay community.
Must the school publish the second article? According to the Sixth, Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits, the answer is yes. If a school in these jurisdictions
publishes an article that represents one point of view, it may not then
exclude the opposing viewpoint.
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,2 the United States
Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a high school
1. Hypothetical adapted from Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1005-07
(9th Cir. 2000).
2. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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principal's decision to remove two articles from the school's newspaper.3
The Court held that a school may restrict expressive activities that might
be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school,4 so long as the
restrictions are based on legitimate pedagogical concerns.' The
Hazelwood Court initially applied the "public forum analysis" to the
paper.6 Under this analysis, any regulation of speech in a government-
owned or sponsored forum must be viewpoint-neutral.7 However, the
Court did not complete its public forum analysis because it never
analyzed the principal's decision for viewpoint-neutrality.8
While the First and Third Circuits have interpreted Hazelwood's
omission of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement as eliminating this
obligation in the public school context, the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have continued to require viewpoint-neutrality when schools
regulate speech in school-sponsored forums. This Comment argues that
the First and Third Circuits have advanced the more accurate
interpretation of Hazelwood. This approach more closely reflects the text
of the Hazelwood opinions. Further, eliminating the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement is in alignment with the judicial tradition of deference to
local authorities and reflects the historical function of school
administrators. Finally, this approach allows courts to avoid the doctrinal
difficulties associated with distinguishing permissible content-based
regulations from impermissible viewpoint-based regulations.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of public school First
Amendment jurisprudence, including a discussion of the public forum
doctrine and the distinction between content and viewpoint
discrimination. It then traces the extent to which schools may inculcate
particular values or viewpoints. Part II examines the Hazelwood majority
and dissenting opinions. Part III reviews circuit court opinions
interpreting Hazelwood's treatment of viewpoint-neutrality. Part IV
argues that the text of the Hazelwood opinion, the tradition of judicial
deference to local school authorities, and the realities of public school
administration justify abrogating the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in
public schools without unduly threatening students' First Amendment
3. Id. at 262.
4. Id. at 27 1.
5. Id. at 273.
6. Id. at 267.
7. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); infra notes
21-25 and accompanying text.
8. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
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rights. Part V concludes that based on these factors, the First and Third
Circuits' interpretation of Hazelwood is superior.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Public Forum Doctrine and the Viewpoint/Content Neutrality
Distinction
Public forums are government-owned property used by individuals for
expressive activity.9 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized three major
categories of public forums."0 First, "quintessential" public forums
include places which have traditionally been used for assembly and
communication, such as parks and town squares." In these forums,
restrictions on the content of expression must be narrowly drawn to
further a compelling state interest and may not be based on the speaker's
point of view. 2 Second, "voluntary" public forums are places which the
government chooses to open to the public, such as theaters or school
facilities.' 3 Though not required to open the facility, once the government
does so it is bound by the same laws that govern quintessential public
forums. 4 However, if the government opens a voluntary public forum for
a specific purpose, it can regulate expressive activity in keeping with that
purpose. 5  Third, government-owned property that has neither
traditionally been used for public expression nor designated for such use
is a "nonpublic" forum.'6 The government may limit speech in these
forums by reserving them for their intended purposes, as long as the
9. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-46.
10. Id. at 45-46.
11. Id. at 45 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939)).
12. See id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 46.
15. For instance, a municipal theater may not ban production of"Hair" because public theaters are
dedicated to expressive activity, see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555
(1975), and persons may not be excluded from libraries for engaging in expressive activity that does
not significantly depart from normal use, see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
16. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. This is something of a misnomer, because although the "nonpublic
forum" is not generally open to the public for expressive activity, it refers to government-owned
property and thus remains "public."
1229
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restrictions are reasonable and not intended to suppress a particular
perspective. 7
Even when no public forum is involved, nearly every First
Amendment analysis requires a determination of whether the law in
question is content-neutral or content-based. 8 The distinction between
content-based and content-neutral regulations has been called "the most
pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression."' 9
Further, while a finding of content discrimination may invite further
analysis," a finding of viewpoint discrimination terminates the inquiry
and invalidates the law.2' The constitutionality of a law restricting
expression thus depends largely on its initial classification as an issue of
either content or viewpoint.
Content-neutral laws are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny,'
and are permissible only if they further a significant government interest
unrelated to the suppression of speech and the incidental restriction on
expression is no greater than necessary.' Content-based laws are subject
to strict scrutiny, meaning that the government can regulate the content
of speech only if it promotes a compelling government interest and is the
least restrictive means available.24 Viewpoint-based regulations violate
the First Amendment.' While the Supreme Court has offered examples
of impermissible viewpoint restrictions,26 it has not established a
predictable border between viewpoint and content, or even defined
viewpoint discrimination.
17. Id. For examples of nonpublic forums, see, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (airport terminals); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def and Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985) (charitable fundraising drives in federal offices).
18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Free Speech: Problems
in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 53 (2000).
19. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
189, 189 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319, 334 (1988) (deeming an ordinance prohibiting
display of signs criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of that government's embassy as
viewpoint-neutral, but invalidated as not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest).
21. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 56.
22. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
23. Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
24. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 US 115, 126 (1989).
25. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 56. This Comment argues that Hazelwood created an
exception to the viewpoint-neutrality rule for public schools. See infra Part IV.
26. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (holding that a
state may not deny a license to a film because it advocates adultery under certain circumstances).
27. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 59.
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Classification of a law as viewpoint-based is certainly fatal,28 but
content-based laws survive in a number of circumstances, including:
when they are intended to remedy the "secondary effects" of an
expressive activity,' when the government demonstrates a sufficiently
compelling reason and narrow tailoring of the law to achieve that
interest,3" or when the court applies a lenient level of scrutiny.3' Courts
can also avoid strict scrutiny by classifying a forum as nonpublic.
Because nonpublic forums are subject to less stringent review, content-
based restrictions in nonpublic forums may survive if they do not rise to
the level of viewpoint discrimination.32  In contrast, viewpoint
discrimination is forbidden in all government-owned property, including
nonpublic forums.33
Viewpoint and content are related concepts, but their relationship
shifts from case to case. Although courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, and commentators have described viewpoint as a form of
content,34 the Supreme Court has also treated them as distinct ideas.3"
Further, the point at which a content-based regulation ceases to affect an
entire topic and becomes viewpoint-based-oppressing a specific point
of view within that topic-remains unclear.
28. See id.at 56.
29. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) (upholding a zoning
ordinance prohibiting adult theatres within 1,000 feet of residential zones, churches or schools based
in part on the fact that the regulation was aimed at the secondary behaviors associated with such
venues, not the content of the expression within theatres).
30. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding that a law prohibiting solicitation
of votes within 100 feet of polls survived strict scrutiny).
31. See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L
REV. 113,118 n.37 (1981).
32. See Penj Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1981).
33. See Chermerinsky, supra note 18, at 56.
34. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("[v]iewpoint discrimination is... an egregious form of content discrimination"); Amy Sabrin,
Thinking About Content: Can it Play an Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts? 102
YALE L J. 1209, 1221 ("[V]iewpoint is perhaps the most subjective element of content"); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 51 ("Phrased another way, the requirement that the government be
content neutral in its regulation of speech means that the government must be both viewpoint-neutral
and subject-matter neutral .... If a law is either a viewpoint or a subject-matter restriction it is
deemed to be content based.").
35. See, eg., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The First
Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 180 at 257 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Whether a provision is
viewpoint-neutral is irrelevant to the question whether it is also content-neutral.").
1231
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Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Hill v. Colorado36 illustrates the
difficulty of consistently applying the content and viewpoint labels.
Justice Souter quoted Justice Kennedy's statement from Ward v. Rock
Against Racism3 7 that "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. ' Though
Justice Souter also recognized subject and viewpoint as different ideas,39
the use of this quote equates content with message, which implies
promotion of an idea or point of view.4" Justice Souter also observed that
subject and viewpoint begin to merge when a regulation burdens
behavior that represents one side of a controversy.4 In addition, the
Supreme Court has indicated that though all content discrimination is not
viewpoint discrimination, all viewpoint discrimination is content
discrimination. 2
When the content of speech is easily distinguished from the speaker's
viewpoint, the difference between content and viewpoint seems clear.
The Court has explained that in nonpublic forums, a speaker may be
excluded if his topic is outside the purpose of that forum, but may not be
denied access "solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an
otherwise includible subject."' 3 For example, if the topic is politics,
Republicans and Democrats represent viewpoints within that topic. If a
nonpublic forum is opened for the purpose of conducting a political
debate, a Democratic speaker may not be denied if Republican speakers
are admitted.
However, when a point of view represents a major philosophy, the
distinction between content and viewpoint appears to collapse. The Court
alluded to this phenomenon in the context of religion in Rosenburger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia." The Rosenburger
36. 530 U.S. 703, 736-37 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring).
37. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
38. Hill, 530 U.S. at. 736-37 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added)).
39. Id.
40. As the terminology used by courts and commentators in this context is inconsistent, for the
purposes of this Comment, the term "content" is synonymous with "topic," "subject," and "subject
matter."
41. Hill, 530 U.S. at 736-37 (Souter, J., concurring).
42. Rosenburger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see also
supra note 34.
43. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
44. 515 U.S. 819.
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Court acknowledged that the distinction between content and viewpoint
was "not a precise one" in this circumstance, but classified religious
"perspectives" as viewpoints.4s Because the Court has not defined
viewpoint discrinination,6 the point at which a regulation burdens an
entire topic rather than a viewpoint within that topic remains unclear.
The Court has further obscured the distinction between content and
viewpoint by declining to fully explain its characterization of potentially
viewpoint-based laws as viewpoint-neutral. In Boos v. Barry,47 the Court
described a law prohibiting signs criticizing a foreign government within
five hundred feet of that government's embassy as viewpoint-neutral,
because it banned all criticism of all foreign governments. 48 But, as one
scholar has pointed out, exclusion of criticism in lieu of praise does in
fact represent viewpoint discrimination.' In NEA v. Finley,"0 the Court
found no viewpoint bias in a law requiring the National Endowment for
the Arts to consider the "general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public"' when allocating
federal grants. 2 Although the Court stated that these standards do not
constitute viewpoint discrimination," one scholar has noted that these
terms arguably inherently implicate viewpoint.5 4 Finally, in Arkansas
Educational Televisions Commission v. Forbes,55 the Court denied that a
minor candidate's exclusion from a debate on public television was
viewpoint-based, explaining that the exclusion was based on his
objective lack of support, rather than disagreement with his political
platform.56 Again, a scholar observed that viewpoint is the very essence
of a political platform, and a minor candidate by definition represents a
minority viewpoint.
57
45. Id. at 831.
46. See Chernerinsky, supra note 18, at 59.
47. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
48. Id. at 319 (invalidating the law as content-based).
49. See generally Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 99, 118-
19 (1996).
50. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
52. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572-73.
53. Id. at 583.
54. Chemnerinsky, supra note 18, at 58.
55. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
56. Id. at 682.
57. Chernerinsky, supra note 18, at 57.
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In the context of the public forum analysis, the threshold question is
whether a regulation proscribes a particular viewpoint or merely an entire
topic." This inquiry often dictates whether the regulation will survive.'
Despite the significance of this determination, the Court has not
articulated a method for deciding when a regulation suppresses a point of
view instead of a certain subject, and its application of the "viewpoint"
label has been unpredictable.'
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Endorses a Public School's Right to
Indoctrinate Students According to Community Viewpoints
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently reinforced a public school's
right to inculcate its students with values necessary to become productive
citizens, even when that inculcation advances a particular perspective
and excludes its counterpoint." Unlike any other government entity, the
public school is charged with two potentially incompatible tasks:
encouraging diverse, independent thought while the instilling particular
values that produce contributing members of the community.62 The
collision of these principles continues to redefine the line between
appropriate indoctrination and unconstitutional censorship. 3 In order to
fulfill its educational mandate, the school may choose not to tolerate or
sponsor speech that undermines its pedagogy."5 Therefore, speech in
school-sponsored forums is exempt from the full First Amendment
protections available in other contexts.66
The school's daily custody of children in loco parentis further
distinguishes it from other government facilities.67 The fact that all
American children must receive a state-approved education implicates
58. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 44-57 and accorhpanying text.
61. See David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial
Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477,497-98 (1981).
62. See id. at 499-505; Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Seb. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864-65 (1982).
63. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943) (holding mandatory
flag salute unconstitutional).
64. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
65. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271-72 (1988).
66. Id. at 266, 271-72.
67. See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 at 684 (recognizing the "obvious concern on the part
of... school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children ... from exposure to sexually
explicit, indecent or lewd speech").
1234
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the parental right to raise children free from undue state interference,"
because the state's curriculum may not match parental notions of what
children should learn. This tension between the state's need to educate
productive citizens and the parents' right to raise their child finds some
resolution in the local school board.69 Parents retain the ultimate
authority over what their children learn at school by electing those who
make decisions governing schools.70
Since the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court has confirmed
the state's power to compel attendance, make reasonable regulations, and
prescribe curriculums for public schools.7 ' For example, the Court has
not questioned a school's right to prepare children for citizenship by
inspiring patriotism, but a school cannot compel students to espouse any
particular belief.72 Early American public school laws reflected the
founding fathers' belief that a successful democratic society presupposed
an educated citizenry, and that in order to preserve itself, the state must
indoctrinate the value of democracy and the republican form of
government.' Throughout the nineteenth century, values such as
honesty, obedience, patriotism, and democracy were typical in public
school curricula.74 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters," the Court affirmed
that "certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught. 76
Although public schools' efforts to teach values have frequently
generated controversy,7 the Supreme Court continued to recognize the
right of schools to promote certain core ideals.78 In 1952, the Court
68. See, eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (calling the right to raise one's children
"essential," a "basic civil righ[t] of man," and "[r]ights far more precious than property rights");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (noting the "power of parents to control the education
of their ovm").
69. See Diamond, supra note 61, at 509.
70. The power of the state to vest such authority in the hands of parents was noted by a federal
district court in Michigan and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court without opinion in Mercer v.
Michigan State Board of Education, 379 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1081
(1974).
71. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
72. See AV. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
73. Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling The Free Speech Clause with
Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 769,775 (1995).
74. Id.
75. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
76. Id. at 534.
77. See Bitensky, supra note 73, at 776.
78. See id. at 824-25.
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characterized teachers as "priests of democracy, 79 whose "special task '
was to "foster... habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which
alone make for responsible citizens."'" Twenty years later, the Court
observed that "[t]he importance of the public school in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of values
on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions. 82
In 1982, the Court maintained that "local school boards must be
permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to
transmit community values,' and that there is a 'legitimate and
substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and
traditional values be they social, moral, or political.' 83 In Bethel School
District v. Fraser,84 the Court explained that "[public education] must
inculcate the habits and manners of civility as ... values in themselves
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation."85
The Supreme Court has permitted local school boards to determine
which community values public school students should learn.86 In 1943,
the Court characterized the school board's duties as "important, delicate,
and highly discretionary,"87 and fixed the limitations of the board's
discretion at the Bill of Rights.88 The Court explicitly limited the
judiciary's role in school administration in Epperson v. Arkansas, and
affirmed that control over public schools is vested in state and local
authorities.90 Unless local actions threaten fundamental constitutional
values, the Court will not intervene.91
In 1968, the Supreme Court opened the modem era of public school
student speech jurisprudence. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
79. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
83. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
84. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
85. Id. at 681.
86. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). These ideals or values
frequently correspond with viewpoints. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 58.
87. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
88. Id.
89. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
90. Id. at 104-05.
91. Id.
1236
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Community School District," a school district suspended students for
wearing black armbands to class in protest of the Vietnam War.93 The
Court re-emphasized its tradition of deference to the plenary authority of
states and local governments to regulate public schools, but noted that
such regulation must conform to the Constitution.94 In the absence of a
"substantial disruption" to school activities, the Court held that students
have a First Amendment right to demonstrate a political opinion.95 The
Court announced the broad rule that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."96 The Court recognized
the first exception to Tinker in Fraser, holding that a school district may
determine the appropriate manner of speech in classrooms and school
assemblies. 7 The Court created a second exception for school-sponsored
speech in Hazelwood.98
The uniquely local character of public schools underlies the Court's
consistent deference to the judgment of local authorities in matters of
free speech and school administration.99 As Justice Powell observed, "no
other single agency of government at any level is closer to the people
whom it serves than the typical school board."' ' Parents' right to raise
children according to their own beliefs and the role of the school in loco
parentis also necessitates judicial latitude. The Court has therefore
allowed a community's values to guide the education of its children.'
C. The Constitution Limits a School's Right to Inculcate Viewpoint
A school official's right to make a viewpoint-based decision ends
when the decision deprives an individual of his or her constitutional
rights. In the context of a teacher's right to academic freedom,0 2 the
92. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
93. Id. at 504.
94. Id. at 507.
95. Id. at 510-11.
96. Id. at 506.
97. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
98. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988).
99. See Diamond, supra note 61, at 506-09.
100. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 864.
102. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Though beyond the scope of this
Comment, teachers do not have "unlimited liberty" to determine the content of their curriculum. See
Adams v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Supreme Court has said that the First Amendment "does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom,"'1 3 and has recognized
that "the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."'04 Yet the point at
which inculcation becomes deprivation has proven remarkably elusive,
partially because the constitutionality of a decision often appears to
depend upon the subjective motives of the decisionmaker.' 5
The Court's decision in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District v. Pico'0 6 represents the most sustained effort to articulate
the distinction between inculcation and suppression and demonstrates the
emphasis placed on the motive behind a regulation.' 7 In Pico, a plurality
of the Court determined that if a school district's decision to remove
certain books from the school library was based on their dislike of the
ideas they contained, it violated the First Amendment.3 ' The district
deemed certain books such as Richard Wright's Black Boy "anti-
American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy."' 09 While
respecting the broad discretion of school boards in managing school
affairs,"0 the Court explained that they may not exercise their discretion
in "a narrowly partisan or political manner" because "[o]ur Constitution
does not permit the official suppression of ideas.' The Court
specifically limited its holding to prohibiting school boards from
removing books from school libraries based on their dislike of ideas the
books contained."'
In Pico, several Justices placed the intent of the school district at the
heart of their opinions." 3 Justice Brennan explained that an all-white
school board's decision to remove all books written by black authors
103. Keyishian, 385 U.S.at 603. The Court has invoked this language to reinforce the student's
right to be exposed to ideas and the teacher's right to teach them and to buttress the judicial bias
against contracting the spectrum of available knowledge. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 866-71.
104. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
105. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871, 879.
106. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
107. Id. at 861-62.
108. Id. at 871.
109. Id. at 857.
110. Id. at 864.
111. Id. at 863, 870-71 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 861-62. The Court stated that removal of books based on "educational suitability"
would be permissible, but did not define the term. Id. at 871.
113. See id. at 871, 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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would surely be unconstitutional as motivated by racial animus."' Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion similarly implied that the purpose of the
removal is essential to determining its constitutionality." 5 The Court
remanded the case for trial on the question of intent, instructing that if
the board removed the books with the intention of denying access to a
particular idea with which they disagreed, they had violated the
Constitution."6 If the removal decision was based on the board's
understanding that the books were vulgar or educationally unsuitable,
however, it would be "perfectly permissible."
'
"
7
The public forum doctrine and underlying distinction between
content- and viewpoint-based decisions constitute the doctrinal tools with
which the Court shaped the Hazelwood opinion." Recognizing the
government's unique role as educator led the Court to support the right
of schools to inculcate both the values of the state and the local
community."9 Although a school cannot deprive students of access to
ideas simply because it disagrees with them, it can exercise broad
discretion in determining curriculum content. 2
II. THE HAZELWOOD DECISION
Although the Hazelwood Court employed the public forum doctrine
when determining the constitutionality of a principal's decision to
remove articles from the school newspaper, it did not apply the
viewpoint-neutrality requirement.'' In Hazelwood, a high school
principal excised two articles from the school newspaper, Spectrum.v "
One article described the experiences of three pregnant students. l2 The
principal concluded that despite the use of false names, the identities of
the students were intelligible and because the students' boyfriends and
families had not consented, the article would invade their privacy. 24 He
also believed that the references to sexual activity and birth control were
114. Id. at 871.
115. Id. at 907.
116. Id. at 871.
117. Id.
118. Hazelwood Seb. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-76 (1988).
119. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
121. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,270 (1988).
122. Id. at 263.
123. Id. at266.
124. Id.
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inappropriate in light of the age of the paper's intended audience. 125 The
second article addressed the impact of divorce on students and included a
quote from a named student criticizing her father's behavior. 126 The
principal objected to this article because the father had not been offered
the opportunity to respond.
127
The Hazelwood Court recited Tinker's teaching that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,"'128 but
recognized that students' rights in public schools are not automatically
coextensive with those of adults in other circumstances. 29 In spite of
Tinker's speech-protective holding, the Court in Hazelwood held that a
school may restrict "expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school,"'30 so long as the restrictions are based on "legitimate
pedagogical concerns."'' While Tinker defined the extent to which a
school must tolerate student speech, the Hazelwood Court distinguished
the paper as a school-sponsored forum because of its place within a
curriculum designed to convey information to student participants and
audiences. 132 It then held that educators may exercise editorial control
over school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'' 33
In Hazelwood, the Court classified the paper within the public forum
hierarchy. 34 The Court concluded that Spectrum was a nonpublic forum,
because school officials demonstrated no intent to open its pages to
general use by the journalism staff or the student body. 135 The Court
determined that the lower court relied on equivocal evidence in finding
Spectrum to be a public forum. 36 It then offered a different interpretation
of the supervisory role of school officials, the degree of student
authority, and the function of the paper in the school's curriculum, and
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
130. Id. at 271.
131. Id. at 273.
132. Id. at 271.
133. Id. at 273.
134. Id. at 267.
135. Id. at 268-70.
136. Id. at 269.
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found that those factors did not indicate any intent to create a public
forum. 1
37
The Court cited Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 33 in which the Court classified internal school mail facilities as a
nonpublic forum. The Hazelwood Court concluded that under Perry, the
school had not "by policy or practice"'39 opened the paper to
"indiscriminate use"'40 by the student journalists or by the student
population, and had therefore reserved it for its intended curricular
purpose of a "supervised learning experience.''. The paper thus
remained a nonpublic forum, subject to regulations reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.'42 Although public forum analysis
usually includes an examination of viewpoint-neutrality,'43  the
Hazelwood Court concluded its analysis without testing the principal's
decision under this standard.'"
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion criticized the majority for
licensing "thought control,"' 45 enabling "camouflage[d] viewpoint
discrimination,"'146 and approving of "brutal censorship.' ' 47 He claimed
that the majority opinion sanctioned "official censorship of student
speech"'14 and accused the principal of striking the articles based on their
viewpoint. 49 The Tinker Court, according to Justice Brennan, struck the
appropriate balance between pedagogical direction and student
expression. 50 Finally, Justice Brennan acknowledged that educators
should have the authority to limit the "substantive scope" of a school
137. Id.
138. 460 U.S. 37,47 (1983).
139. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
144. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270,
145. Id. at 286.
146. Id. at 288.
147. Id. at 289.
148. Id. at 287.
149. Id. at 288.
150. Id. at280.
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publication to a certain topic, such as sports or literary criticism,' but
argued explicitly that viewpoint discrimination was unacceptable.1
2
III. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF HAZEL WOOD
Because the Supreme Court in Hazelwood did not explicitly consider
viewpoint-neutrality in its holding, the circuits are in disagreement over
whether nonpublic forums in public schools are subject to the same
standards that govern regulation of expressive activity in other public
forums."5 3 The Eleventh, Ninth and Sixth Circuits have continued to
require schools to be viewpoint-neutral when regulating speech in
school-sponsored forums. 54 In contrast, the First and Third Circuits have
interpreted the Hazelwood majority's omission of a viewpoint-neutrality
requirement as announcing a new standard for regulation of school-
sponsored speech. 5
A. The Eleventh, Ninth and Sixth Circuits Require Schools to be
Viewpoint-Neutral under Hazelwood
In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit court to interpret
Hazelwood to require viewpoint-neutrality when public schools regulate
school-sponsored speech. In Searcey v. Harris,'56 the Eleventh Circuit
found no evidence that the Hazelwood majority intended to alter
fundamental First Amendment principles by allowing school officials to
discriminate based on viewpoint.'57 Rather, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the Hazelwood Court had acknowledged a school's
ability to discriminate based on content.'58 In Searcey, a peace
organization sought access to a high school's career day, but the school
151. Id. at 287.
152. Id. at 286-87 ("The mere fact of school sponsorship does not... license such thought
control in the high school, whether through school suppression of disfavored viewpoints or through
official assessment of topic sensitivity. The former would constitute unabashed and unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination .... The State's prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely (or
to limit its subject matter) no more entitles it to dictate which viewpoints students may express on its
pages, than the State's prerogative to close down the schoolhouse entitles it to prohibit the
nondisruptive expression of antiwar sentiments within its gates.") (emphasis added).
153. See infra Parts JII.A and B.
154. See infra Part III.A.
155. See infra Part III.B.
156. 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
157. Id. at 1319.
158. Id.
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board denied it access." 9 After the organization filed suit, the board
adopted regulations governing admission to career day. 6 These
regulations included a rule against participants' denigrating military
careers or discouraging particular fields. 6' The Eleventh Circuit held that
the presenters had a First Amendment right to offer valid and informative
disadvantages of other careers,'62 despite the school board's argument
that Hazelwood eliminated the requirement that a school's restrictions be
viewpoint-neutral. 63
The Eleventh Circuit considered the possibility that Hazelwood
eliminated the viewpoint-neutrality requirement but decided that it did
not alter the traditional nonpublic forum rule" as articulated in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.6 In Cornelius,
the U.S. Supreme Court had restated the familiar rule for regulation of
speech in a government owned, nonpublic forum: restrictions based on
subject matter are permissible, so long as they are reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral. 66 In Cornelius, the Court upheld the exclusion of
political and advocacy groups from an annual charitable fundraising
drive conducted by federal employees in federal offices during working
hours, based on the fact that the drive was a nonpublic forum and the
exclusion was viewpoint-neutral. 67 The Eleventh Circuit determined that
Hazelwood did not alter the Cornelius test.168 Instead the court stated that
Cornelius called for reasonableness and Hazelwood provided the context
in which the reasonableness should be determined.
69
The Ninth Circuit provided less explanation for its interpretation of
Hazelwood in Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada v. Clark County
School District.70 The court upheld a school's right to refuse to publish
Planned Parenthood advertisements in its newspaper, yearbook, and
athletic programs.' 7 1 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the exclusion was
159. Id. at 1316.
160. Idat 1317.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1326.
163. Id. at 1319.
164. Id.
165. 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
166. Id. at 806.
167. Id. at 811-13.
168. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319.
169. Id.
170. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
171. Id. at 830.
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permissible because the school paper was a nonpublic forum and because
the action was not an attempt at viewpoint discrimination.7 2 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the school's action must be reasonable under
Hazelwood and viewpoint-neutral under Cornelius." Consequently,
although the Cornelius rule for regulating nonpublic forums was
unrelated to public schools, the Ninth Circuit applied it in Planned
Parenthood and thereby added a viewpoint-neutrality requirement not
mentioned by the Hazelwood Court.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished its Planned Parenthood holding from
an earlier Ninth Circuit case, San Diego Committee Against Registration
and the Draft v. Governing Board of Grossmont Union High School
District [hereinafter CARD]. 74 In CARD, the court held a high school's
rejection of advertisements for a nonprofit organization promoting
alternatives to military service while accepting military recruitment
advertisements constituted viewpoint discrimination." 5 The Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed that the school engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination by opening the school paper to advertisements but
denying CARD's, regardless of whether the newspaper was a limited
public forum or a nonpublic forum.1
76
In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the instant
case from CARD because in CARD, the school proscribed a specific idea
within the general category of presentations related to military service,
while in Planned Parenthood the district banned the entire subject of
"birth control products and information."'177 The Planned Parenthood
court found that the paper and yearbook were nonpublic forums, and
stated that the school's actions were permissible because they were "not
an effort at viewpoint discrimination."'78 Presumably, if the Ninth Circuit
had believed that excluding the Planned Parenthood ads suppressed a
particular viewpoint, the school would have violated the First
Amendment.
79
172. Id.
173. Id. at 829-30.
174. 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986).
175. Id. at 1481.
176. Planned Parenthood of S. N.Y. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 828 n.19 (9th Cir.
1991).
177. Id. at 829.
178. Id. at 830.
179. Id.
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In 1999, the Sixth Circuit aligned with the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits. In Kincaid v. Gibson,' the Sixth Circuit interpreted the
Hazelwood opinion as noting that since the school did not intentionally
open the paper as a public forum, it remained nonpublic, and that schools
may impose reasonable, non-viewpoint-based restrictions on speech in
nonpublic forums."' Although the Hazelwood Court never addressed the
issue of viewpoint-neutrality, the Sixth Circuit, without explanation,
determined that Hazelwood required viewpoint-neutrality.' In Kincaid,
Kentucky State University students alleged that the school's refusal to
distribute the yearbook violated their First Amendment rights.8 3 The
Vice-President for Student Affairs disapproved of the yearbook's theme,
"Destination Unknown," the inclusion of numerous pictures of political
figures instead of people and events related to KSU, the lack of picture
captions, and the decision to make the cover a color different than the
school colors."8 4 The Sixth Circuit held that under Hazelwood, the
yearbook was a nonpublic forum and that confiscating it was reasonable
in light of its failure to accomplish its intended purposes.' In sum,
although the Hazelwood Court did not explicitly eliminate the viewpoint-
neutrality requirement for regulation of speech in school-sponsored
forums, three circuits have interpreted its omission as reaffirming the
traditional standard of viewpoint-neutrality in nonpublic forums.
B. The First and Third Circuits Interpret Hazelwood as Eliminating
the Requirement of Viewpoint-Neutrality
In 1993, the First Circuit became the first circuit court to interpret
Hazelwood as having changed the standard for regulating nonpublic
forums in public schools. In Ward v. Hickey,"8 6 a biology teacher alleged
that she was denied reappointment because she conducted an in-class
180. 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999), vacated and reheard, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001). On
rehearing, the Sixth Circuit explained that that Hazelwood is only of limited applicability to college
newspapers as college papers are limited public forums, not nonpublic forums. Id. at 346 n.5. The
Sixth Circuit did not criticize the manner in which the panel applied Hazelwood; rather, the court
stated that the panel's error was in applying Hazelwood at all. Id.
181. Id. at 727 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 723.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 726-27.
186. 996 F.2d 448 (Ist Cir. 1993).
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discussion about abortion. 8 7 The teacher asserted a First Amendment
right to discuss controversial issues in class. 88 A federal district court
determined that under Perry retaliation was permissible as long as it was
not viewpoint-based.'89 The First Circuit disagreed and held that under
Hazelwood, the Perry rationale does not apply to teachers' classroom
speech. 9 The First Circuit interpreted Hazelwood to mean that the First
Amendment does not require regulations of school-sponsored speech to
be viewpoint-neutral. 9' The court offered no justification for its
understanding of Hazelwood beyond its plain reading of the text,'92 but
affirmed the judgment in favor of the school on other grounds. 93
In C.H. v. Oliva, 94 the Third Circuit aligned with the First Circuit and
held that a student's First Amendment rights were not violated when a
teacher prevented him from presenting religious material to his first
grade class, because the restriction was reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern under Hazelwood.9 The student argued that under
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District 96 and Rosenburger, a
school cannot prohibit religious viewpoints while permitting secular
ones. 97 In Lamb's Chapel, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a school
district could not refuse a church group access to school property after
school hours because the group planned to offer parenting classes from a
religious perspective. 98 Similarly, in Rosenburger, the Court found that
187. Id. at 450. Ward involved a teacher's speech in the classroom, which the court noted as
factually distinct from the student speech at issue in Hazelwood. Id. at 453. Nevertheless, the First
Circuit observed that at least one other court had applied the Hazelwood test to teachers' classroom
speech, and found the analogy appropriate because instructional statements made by a teacher are
curricular, like the journalism class in Hazelwood, and like the school newspaper, the classroom was
not a public forum. See id. at 453.
188. Id. at 450-51.
189. Ward, 996 F.2d at 454.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 456.
194. 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated and reheard en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (2000). The Third
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court regarding the events of plaintiff's first-grade year,
which had given rise to the panel's discussion of Hazelwood. Id at 203. The panel analysis of
Hazelwood thus remains as persuasive authority on the circuit's position.
195. Id. at 174.
196. 508 U.S. 384, 385 (1993).
197. 195 F.3d at 173.
198. 508 U.S. at 394.
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excluding a campus religious club from funding offered to all other
extracurricular organizations violated the First Amendment.'99
The Third Circuit rejected the comparison, noting that in both Lamb's
Chapel and Rosenburger, the speech at issue was more appropriately
characterized as "tolerated" (taking place on school grounds but not
attributable to the school itself), as in Tinker, rather than school-
sponsored, as in Hazelwood."' The Third Circuit confronted the question
of whether Hazelwood required viewpoint-neutrality, and determined
that it did not: "Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that
educators may impose non-viewpoint-neutral restrictions on the content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
those restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."O'' As an example, the Third Circuit explained that a school
may have a legitimate pedagogical interest in suppressing speech that
promotes alcohol use or endorses one side of a contentious political
issue, and those actions may not be viewpoint-neutral. 2
In sum, the First and Third Circuits have held that the traditional
public forum analysis no longer applies when public schools regulate
school-sponsored speech. The Third Circuit has even suggested that
schools must be allowed to make viewpoint-based decisions to effectuate
their legitimate pedagogical goals. In contrast, the Eleventh, Ninth and
Sixth Circuits refused to excise such a fundamental tenet of First
Amendment law without explicit direction from the U.S. Supreme Court.
IV. PUBLIC SCHOOLS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO
REGULATE SCHOOL-SPONSORED SPEECH IN A
VIEWPOINT-NEUTRAL MANNER UNDER HAZELWOOD
Under Hazelwood, public schools should not be required to maintain
viewpoint-neutrality when regulating school-sponsored speech for
legitimate pedagogical reasons. Taken together, the text of the
Hazelwood opinions indicate that the U.S. Supreme Court did not intend
to require viewpoint-neutral regulation of school-sponsored forums.0 3
Abandoning the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in this narrow context
preserves the school's ability to communicate fundamental social values.
199. 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
200. Oliva, 195 R3d at 173.
201. Id. at 172-73.
202. Id. at 173.
203. See infra Part IV.A.
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Further, this interpretation is consistent with courts' traditional deference
to local school authorities and enables school boards to operate as local
democratic units transmitting the community's values to children.20 4
Assuming that viewpoints often represent values, requiring school
administrators to be viewpoint-neutral when choosing what speech to
sponsor would signal a radical change in the nature of public education.
Contrary to the beliefs of some circuit courts,0 5 such an interpretation of
Hazelwood does not require students to forfeit all First Amendment
rights. After Hazelwood, schools may only restrict expression in school-
sponsored forums if such restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns,20 6 which eliminates the risk of school boards
removing all but the most mainstream perspectives from its curriculum.
A. Textual Evidence from Hazelwood Indicates the Court's Intent to
Eliminate the Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement
Because the Hazelwood majority did not complete its analysis of the
school newspaper as a nonpublic forum, it never addressed the issue of
viewpoint-neutrality. Although the public forum doctrine usually
requires courts to determine whether a regulation suppresses a particular
viewpoint, the Hazelwood majority's truncated application of the public
forum analysis indicates that it intended to eliminate the viewpoint-
neutrality requirement in public school-sponsored forums.20 7 The
Hazelwood Court initially distinguished situations in which a school
sponsors student speech from situations in which a school tolerates
individual student speech on school grounds.2 8 The Court then examined
the principal's decision to remove the articles for reasonableness. 209 If the
Court intended to impose standard nonpublic forum strictures on public
schools, the principal's actions would have been analyzed for evidence
of viewpoint-neutrality instead of simply for reasonableness." 0 The
Court's unexplained abandonment of traditional public forum analysis
suggests recognition of a new category-public school nonpublic
forums-in which educators may control speech in school-sponsored
204. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
205. See infra Part V.E.
206. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,270 (1988).
207. See supra notes 134-144.
208. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
209. Id. at 274.
210. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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expressive activities so long as their actions are "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns. '
The Hazelwood Court's use of viewpoint-based examples to
demonstrate circumstances in which a school must control student
expression in order to further its educational goals indicates that the
majority intended to create a new, non-viewpoint-neutral standard for
regulation of school-sponsored speech."' For instance, the Court
authorized the school to refuse to sponsor student speech that may appear
to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or "conduct otherwise
inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'
21 3
Debates surrounding legalization of marijuana or lowering the drinking
age may involve viewpoints with which a school may choose to
dissociate itself, and "shared values" almost necessarily implicate
viewpoint.214 Further, the Court observed that the dissenting opinion's
approach could encourage many schools to shut down papers altogether
rather than be forced to print things that are "sexually explicit, racially
intemperate, or personally insulting, 215 which implies that schools would
be unable to promote even the most universal viewpoint unless it agreed
to publish its counterpoint.
The dissenting opinion in Hazelwood provides further evidence of the
majority's intention to abolish the viewpoint-neutrality requirement.
Criticizing the majority, Justice Brennan spoke repeatedly in terms of
viewpoint.26 The dissent's concession that schools can regulate the
content of school-sponsored speech217 suggests that the majority holding
must have been more speech-restrictive, specifically, legitimizing not
only content, but viewpoint discrimination as well. Justice Brennan
illustrated the unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination2 8 and
stated that school sponsorship does not legitimize "suppression of
disfavored viewpoints"2 9 because such discrimination violates the
constitution. Had Justice Brennan interpreted the majority opinion as
upholding the viewpoint-neutrality requirement, a demonstration of the
211. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
212. Id. at 272.
213. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
214. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 58; Diamond, supra note 61, at 496-99.
215. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276 n.9.
216. See supra notes 145-152 and accompanying text
217. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 286-87.
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unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination would not have been
necessary.
In conclusion, Hazelwood omitted the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement from its analysis of Spectrum under the public forum
doctrine, but the dissent spoke clearly in terms of viewpoint. The
dissent's attention to the unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination
indicates Justice Brennan's belief that the majority intended to dispense
with viewpoint-neutrality in public school nonpublic forums. The
Court's decision to use viewpoint-based examples to illustrate situations
in which schools must foreclose expression to further its educational
goals indicates the Court's implicit acknowledgment of the need to treat
public schools differently than other public forums.
B. The Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits Misinterpreted Hazelwood
as Upholding the Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement for Nonpublic
Forums in Public Schools
The Kincaid, Planned Parenthood, and Searcey courts included a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement when they restated the holding of
Hazelwood,22 even though the Hazelwood Court itself did not include
such a requirement.22" ' This interpretation of Hazelwood finds no support
in the text of the Hazelwood opinion.222 Further, the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have failed to acknowledge that public schools are
fundamentally different than other government property, and that the
traditional public forum analysis-specifically, its requirement of
viewpoint-neutrality-is inappropriate in the public school context.
In Kincaid, the Sixth Circuit introduced Hazelwood with the following
statement: "[t]he Court in Hazelwood noted, however, that if the school
did not intentionally create a public forum, then the publication remains a
nonpublic forum, and school officials may impose any reasonable, non-
viewpoint-based restriction on student speech exhibited therein."2" It is
grammatically unclear whether the Kincaid court intended to attribute
both of these conclusions to the Hazelwood court, or only the statement
that the paper remained a nonpublic forum. If the Kincaid court intended
to credit Hazelwood for the entire sentence, it misread the Hazelwood
220. See supra notes 168, 173 and 182 and accompanying text.
221. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
222. Id.
223. Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1999).
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opinion, because the majority made no mention of viewpoint-
neutrality. 4 If the Kincaid court only intended to cite Hazelwood's
conclusion that the paper was a nonpublic forum and added the
viewpoint-neutrality gloss itself, it assumed that the Hazelwood court
intended to include a viewpoint-neutrality requirement, though the Court
in fact remained silent.' The Kincaid court offers no explanation for
either reading.
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits added a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement to Hazelwood.' Both the Planned
Parenthood and Searcey courts cite to the U. S. Supreme Court's opinion
in Cornelius v. NAACP as the rule governing speech regulation in
nonpublic forums. 7 Under Cornelius, regulation of speech in a
nonpublic forum must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 8 However,
Cornelius involved access to federal offices for fundraising purposes 9
and the case did not implicate the unique concerns associated with public
schools. Consequently, Cornelius is inapplicable to the circumstances in
Planned Parenthood or Searcey. Despite the fact that Cornelius did not
involve public schools, the Ninth Circuit adopted its rule in the public
school context in Planned Parenthood without acknowledging the
possibility that the Supreme Court intended to exempt school-sponsored
forums from the viewpoint-neutrality requirement.2 ° Similarly, in
Searcey, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Hazelwood as consistent with
the Cornelius rule." Yet the fact that Hazelwood's holding overlaps
with half of Cornelius' traditional analysis does not explain the omission
of the other half of the traditional rule from the Hazelwood opinion.
Cornelius required reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality;1 2
Hazelwood required only reasonableness."
The Eleventh Circuit expressed reluctance to abrogate viewpoint-
neutrality, a fundamental tenet of First Amendment law, without explicit
224. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 173, 182 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 169, 173 and accompanying text.
228. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
229. Id. at 790.
230. Planned Parenthood of S. Nev. v. Clark County Sch. Dist, 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir.
1991).
231. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 (1lth Cir. 1989).
232. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
233. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,270 (1988).
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direction from the U.S. Supreme Court." Viewpoint-neutrality is a
predictable indicator of First Amendment violations, 23 5 and wholesale
elimination of such a requirement would follow only from a clear
directive. However, the Eleventh Circuit overestimated the scope of the
issue before it: exempting public schools from the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement leaves the traditional requirements for regulation of speech
in any other public forum in place3 6 Permitting public schools to make
viewpoint-based decisions carves out a single, discrete exception to the
public forum doctrine in recognition of the hybrid role of the public
school as an instrument of the state, and a custodian of children in loco
parentis. 37 It would hardly represent a major overhaul of First
Amendment law.238 Further, the Supreme Court fully understood the
public forum doctrine-each of its three manifestations had been
explained and applied prior to the 1988 Hazelwood opinion.3 Although
the Hazelwood Court's omission of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement
remains mysterious, it was unlikely to have been mere oversight.
Given the importance of viewpoint-neutrality to First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' speech-protective
reading of Hazelwood is not surprising. 4 ° However, only the Eleventh
Circuit entertained the possibility of the alternative, legitimate
interpretation advanced by the First and Third Circuits.24 The Kincaid,
Planned Parenthood, and Searcey courts could have reached the same
result by interpreting Hazelwood as having abrogated the viewpoint-
neutrality requirement in school-sponsored nonpublic forums. In
Kincaid, the yearbook suffered from layout and design flaws, which
could be remedied by reasonable, content-based restrictions unrelated to
any viewpoint. Similarly, without engaging in a viewpoint analysis, the
Planned Parenthood court could have held that a school may choose not
to sponsor controversial speech. Finally, the Searcey court could have
234. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7, 1325.
235. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 56.
236. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1325.
237. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Part I.B.
239. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S 788, 799-806 (1985); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981); S.E. Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-56
(1975); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-38 (1976).
240. See Chermerinsky, supra note 18, at 56 ("The determination of whether a law is viewpoint
based is thus crucial in determining its constitutionality.").
241. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319.
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used Hazelwood's "reasonableness" requirement 42 to justify its
conclusion that all Career Day presenters could offer informative
disadvantages of other careers, a standard that provides adequate
protection without the inflexibility of the viewpoint label.
243
In sum, without an explicit directive from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Kincaid, Planned Parenthood, and Searcey courts introduced a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement into the Hazelwood holding. The courts
did not ground this interpretation in the text of the Hazelwood opinion,
and failed to acknowledge that unlike other nonpublic forums, public
schools must advance an educational objective. Adherence to a particular
pedagogy may thus require the school to foreclose speech in its own
forums when the content may be attributable to the school itself.
Elimination of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in this context would
not compromise its vitality in other public forums.
C. Eliminating the Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public
Schools Avoids the Doctrinal Confusion Associated with the
Content and Viewpoint Labels
Since the idea of viewpoint discrimination was introduced in 1939,21
the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that all viewpoint discrimination
is a form of content discrimination.24  Conversely, all content
discrimination is not viewpoint discrimination.2' What remains unclear
is the point at which a discriminatory act crosses the line between
regulation of subject matter and suppresses an idea, opinion or particular
perspective.24 7 Is birth control a topic or an opinion? An adamant anti-
abortionist would argue that the entire subject represents a pro-choice
viewpoint, yet the Planned Parenthood court considered the school
district's policy against advertising birth-control related products or
information a viewpoint-neutral content restriction.24 s Regulation of
major philosophies also raises questions of whether a certain prohibition
242. See Brian S. Black, The Public School: Beyond the Fringes of Public Forum Analysis?, 36
VILL. L REv. 831, 871-73 (1991).
243. See infra Part IV.C.
244. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (striking an ordinance controlling issuance of
speech permits because the city officials would be allowed discretion to arbitrarily suppress "free
expression of views on national affairs").
245. See supra Part I.A.
246. See supra Part I.A.
247. See supra Part I.A.
248. 941 F.2d 817, 829 (1991).
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is viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based. 49 For example, banning all
religious speech may be considered viewpoint-neutral because no
particular religion is excluded in favor of another, or viewpoint-based
because religious speech in general is prohibited in favor of secular
speech. In situations like these, the distinction between content and
viewpoint becomes illusory and artificial.
The viewpoint label is more of a hindrance than a tool, largely due to
its uncertain relationship to the concept of content discrimination zs'
Because the Supreme Court has invalidated every law it deems
viewpoint-based,25" ' the Court now needs to explain why any content-
based law is not viewpoint-based in order to uphold it. This has led to
bizarre rationalizations such as those in Boos, Finley, and Forbes, in
which arguably viewpoint-based regulations were characterized as
viewpoint-neutral. 2 Particularly in the narrow context of nonpublic
forums in public schools, the viewpoint label unnecessarily binds courts
without offering additional analytical capacity. Courts already have
ample authority to invalidate laws aimed at suppressing a particular
viewpoint under the rules governing content.253 They must strike down
content-based laws that lack a compelling government interest or are not
the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.254 Under this
standard, courts could uphold school regulations properly designed to
promote values necessary for the maintenance of a democratic society,
even when those actions discriminate based on viewpoint, but could
invalidate laws intended to suppress a disfavored idea that lack a
compelling government interest (such as a legitimate pedagogical
concern).
To summarize, the distinction between content and viewpoint is both
artificial and unnecessary. The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits'
interpretation of Hazelwood perpetuates the struggle to define the point
at which the content of speech becomes viewpoint, while the First and
Third Circuits' approach obviates that inquiry. If schools are not
249. See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 34-60 and accompanying text; see also Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint
Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 99-115 (1996), for a discussion of the history of
content- and viewpoint-neutrality analysis. This Comment's critique of the viewpoint/content
distinction is limited to the context of public schools.
251. Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 56.
252. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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required to maintain viewpoint-neutrality when regulating speech in
school-sponsored forums, courts will not have to answer theoretical
questions such as whether advertisements for birth control products
represent a topic or a viewpoint. Finally, eliminating the distinction
between content and viewpoint in this limited context offers a clearer
standard for schools and courts: schools may reasonably regulate speech
in school-sponsored forums based on legitimate pedagogical concerns,
without worrying that an apparently permissible, content-based rule
actually implicates a viewpoint and thus violates the First Amendment.
D. Requiring Schools to be Viewpoint-Neutral when Regulating
School-Sponsored Speech would be Inconsistent with the Approved
Authority ofLocal Administrators to Transmit Community Values
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence limits judicial intervention into
school administration to matters that implicate constitutional rights and
recognizes the school's ability to instill values as long as they do not
impose a "pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom. 6 Therefore,
inculcation of values or viewpoints cannot per se violate the First
Amendment in the public school context. 7 The well-established
tradition of deference to local authorities also clashes with a requirement
that educational decisions be viewpoint-neutral and promote no position
to the exclusion of its counterpoint." A realistic understanding of the
role of schools administrators and school boards makes it clear that
viewpoint-neutrality is not only impractical, but impossible in many
circumstances." 9
The Court has never prohibited school administrators from promoting
a particular viewpoint, provided that the regulation is not intended to
suppress ideas and does not compromise other constitutional rights.260 On
the contrary, the court has allowed school boards to freely transmit
social, moral, or political values.26' If a school may advance a viewpoint
through textbook and curriculum selection,262 it is inconsistent to require
it to sponsor and thus endorse speech which undermines its educational
256. See supra note 103; see also notes 61-120 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 61-120 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
259. See Diamond, supra note 61, at 497; see also Bitensky, supra note 73, at 778.
260. See supra notes 61-120 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
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goals. Given that viewpoints often represent values, the Court has never
expected school boards to offer a truly viewpoint-neutral education in
order to comply with the First Amendment. 63 Why, then, must a school
maintain viewpoint-neutrality when sponsoring a forum and effectively
signing its name to the message presented therein?
Requiring schools administrators to be viewpoint-neutral would
paralyze them, because the decisions they make each day necessarily
implicate viewpoint. For example, the viewpoints of school boards and
legislators influence curriculum and textbook selection.26 In the 1980's,
an Oregon statute required history textbooks to "stress the services
rendered by those who achieved our national independence," and banned
any text speaking "slightingly of the founders of the republic., 265 Even
statutes more innocuous than this reflect a viewpoint bias: for example, a
Washington statute requires ADS education, but limits discussion to the
dangers, spread and prevention of the disease. 66 Acceptable as these
perspectives may sound, a parent who believes that discussion of
sexuality is altogether inappropriate in the school setting or that
discussion of AIDS should extend beyond the dangers, spread and
prevention of the disease holds a different viewpoint.
Because the public school tradition has been one of "[v]alue
inculcation, rather than value neutrality," '267 viewpoint bias inheres in the
institution. Even if true viewpoint-neutrality were possible, its
desirability must be seriously questioned.268 Rather than tying the hands
of legislators, schools boards and school administrators by imposing a
requirement fundamentally inconsistent with the goal of public
education, elimination of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in public
school nonpublic forums allows schools to continue pursuing appropriate
pedagogical goals.
E. Hazelwood Adequately Protects Students 'First Amendment
Freedoms
Hazelwood's replacement of the public forum analysis with a mere
"reasonableness" test in public schools could be criticized as too
263. See supra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
264. See Diamond, supra note 61, at 506 n.130.
265. OR. REV. STAT. § 337.260 (1981).
266. WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.230.070(1) (2002).
267. Diamond, supra note 61, at 499.
268. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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compromising of students' rights.269 Granted, the idea of empowering a
school to discriminate based on viewpoint conjures images of racist,
homophobic, or regressive school boards cleansing theaters, newspapers,
and other programs of all but the most mainstream perspectives. But the
First and Third Circuits' interpretation of Hazelwood does not give
school boards an unconditional green light. The Court's requirement that
the school's actions be "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns" imposes a limitation beyond mere reasonableness, for not all
pedagogical concerns are in fact legitimate.27 Even in the context of
curriculum, the Court has not suggested that suppression of disfavored
ideas would qualify as a "legitimate pedagogical concern." '27
One might argue that viewpoint-based values inculcation enables a
community to suppress minority viewpoints, and that without a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement, even a slim majority could become
tyrannous. For example, a school board may wish to allow publication of
an article discussing the negative effects of being adopted by gay parents
but refuse to run an advertisement for a gay pride rally. While this
appears to be a problematic result, note that a viewpoint-neutrality
requirement would prevent a school from excluding an article on the
Biblical condemnation of homosexuals if it publishes an article urging
tolerance. Further, parents who find the community values unacceptable
may send their child to a private school or educate them at home. Finally,
the scope of Hazelwood is rather small in comparison to the overall
authority of school administrators to indoctrinate values. 72 Allowing the
school to decline sponsorship of speech inconsistent with its educational
mission, limited by the requirement that such refusals must be reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, does not prevent the exercise
of First Amendment rights in forums which do not bear the imprimatur
of the school.273 While any democratic system threatens tyranny of the
269. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 287-88 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
270. Id. at 273. For examples of "illegitimate" pedagogical concerns, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning ban on teaching modem foreign languages in public schools); West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding mandatory flag salute
unconstituional); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (overturning ban on teaching theory of
evolution in public schools); and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (overturning ban on wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War).
271. Heins, supra note 49, at 165.
272. See supra notes 61-120 and accompanying text.
273. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,270 (1988).
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majority, the above factors combine to outweigh that risk in relation to
speech sponsored by public schools.
By choosing to sponsor only one viewpoint in its forum, the school
does not foreclose the student's right to express a viewpoint. Speech
which is attributable to the individual falls outside the scope of
Hazelwood, and thus, elimination of the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement for regulation of speech in school-sponsored forums does
not threaten an individual's right to express a viewpoint inconsistent with
the school's educational mission. 74 One might argue that when the
school's decisions directly implicate the individual's First Amendment
right to express a viewpoint (as opposed to textbook selection or
curriculum guidelines, which involve the ancillary right to receive
information), 5 the school should be required to open the forum to both
sides of the debate if it opens it to one. However, a student who wishes to
advocate white supremacy remains free to publicize her opinion at
school, short of Tinker's "substantial disruption" standard.276 Outside of
school, the student may distribute pamphlets on the sidewalk,277 organize
a rally in the city park,278 or even post a website.279 The only forums
denied to her by Hazelwood are those sponsored by the school itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should interpret Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier as eliminating the
viewpoint-neutrality requirement from nonpublic forums in public
schools when administrators regulate speech for legitimate pedagogical
reasons. The majority opinion omitted the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement when applying the public forum analysis to the public
school, and the dissenting opinion explicitly criticized the majority for
274. Id. at 272-73.
275. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982).
276. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
277. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953, 953 (1978) (denying stay of lower court judgment
striking ordinances prohibiting dissemination of materials designed to promote hatred and public
demonstrations of persons wearing military-style uniforms).
278. Id.
279. The U.S. Supreme Court afforded full First Amendment protection to the Internet in Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Addressing student websites created off-campus, courts have used
Tinker's "substantial disruption" standard to assess the constitutionality of a school's regulation of
student websites and have considered whether the student websites rise to the level of an unprotected
threat of violence. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (E.D.
Mo. 1998); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415,92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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eliminating this fundamental principal. Because courts have consistently
deferred to local school authorities in recognition of their dual character
as agents of the state and the parent, and have endorsed the school's right
to inculcate community viewpoints, requiring the school to sponsor
certain viewpoints undermines its right to indoctrinate values through
other means. Finally, elimination of the distinction between viewpoint
and content in this limited context avoids the doctrinal confusion
associated with the viewpoint and content labels without sacrificing
individuals' First Amendment rights. Courts should therefore follow the
interpretation advanced by the First and Third Circuits when analyzing
public schools' restrictions of speech in school-sponsored forums.
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